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Dynamic R&D Competition with Overlapping Ownership
时 间：2025年10月28日（Tue.）
09:00 - 10:30 a.m.
地 点：同德楼208
主 讲：Zhentao Zou（WuhanUniversity）
论文摘要
We study the impact of overlapping ownership on the strategic investment and welfare of firms in a dynamic model of R&D competition. The existence of overlapping ownership induces the follower to invest later through the conventional anticompetitive effect, but the leader to invest earlier through the preemption-exacerbating effect. The former effect improves welfare, while the latter effect harms welfare. When technology uncertainty is low, the strategic equilibrium exhibits a sequential-investment pattern. As the anticompetitive effect dominates, overlapping ownership always improves the welfare of firms. By contrast, when technology uncertainty is high, the preemption incentive is mitigated, and a joint-investment pattern can be sustained. As overlapping ownership exacerbates the preemption incentive, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium may shift from a joint-investment pattern to a sequential-investment pattern. Therefore, overlapping ownership may harm the welfare of firms when the R&D projects have high technology uncertainty.
主讲简介
Zhentao Zou is an Associate Professor in Economics and Management School, Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD from Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His research focuses on continuous-time finance, and his recent work has been published in academic journals such as Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization and Journal of Banking & Finance.
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