毓秀讲堂 |【Seminar 预告】 No.648--李怀露（复旦大学）

We conduct an audit study of China's retail securities industry through 5,504 visits to all financial advisory branches in a representative urban market, interacting with 628 managers across market cycles.  Our study reveals two critical market-contingent patterns: First, during bearish markets, women receive 10% larger commission discounts than men at initial meetings, with this gap expanding to 14% upon return visits – a dynamic that completely disappears during bullish markets. Second, while conservative advice is 17% more likely for women in bearish markets (particularly risk-averse investors), intensifying by 5 percentage points in repeat visits, a 5% advice gap persists even in bullish conditions. These industry-wide discount disparity patterns, robust to manager and firm fixed effects, are explained by a bargaining-cum-signaling model where 1) Buyers often buy investments only after consulting with the seller, 2) Upon return, they typically receive larger discounts, and 3) Women receive larger discounts because managers engage in third-degree price discrimination favoring women, as they are generally more patient than men. The results demonstrate that managers employ statistical discrimination in financial advice that systematically favors women, while revealing how gender discrimination operates through distinct channels: market conditions eliminate pricing disparities but preserve advice differentials. This dual mechanism suggests price discrimination responds to competitive pressures, whereas advice patterns reflect deeper perceptual biases.