
由我院青年常任轨教师杨诶老师、2019级博士生徐奇玉及其导师王文雅老师合作的论文“Bargaining power and trade credit: The heterogeneous effect of credit contractions(议价能力与商业信用:信贷收缩的异质性作用)”发表在金融学科一流期刊 Journal of Banking & Finance(简称“JBF”) 2024年161卷上。在线资源请点击文末“阅读原文”获取。
Bargaining power and trade credit: The heterogeneous effect of credit contractions
Wenya Wang, Qiyu Xu, Ei Yang
Journal of Banking & Finance, 161, 107109.

杨诶
杨诶
上海财经大学金融学院助理教授,波士顿大学经济学博士。研究领域:货币经济学、企业动态、公司金融、平台经济。论文成果发表于Journal of Development Economics。研究论文曾在美国经济学年会(AEA)等国际、国内会议宣讲。

徐奇玉
徐奇玉
上海财经大学金融学院2019级硕博连读生,主要研究兴趣为货币银行、宏观金融、公司金融等。博士期间论文成果发表于Journal of Banking & Finance。研究论文曾在Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society 等会议宣讲。
Journal of Banking & Finance

Journal of Banking & Finance 由Elsevier出版,主要发表银行与金融等领域的理论和实证论文,期刊收录于SSCI,为国际学术界公认的金融子领域顶级期刊(JCR分区Q2、中科院分区2区、ABS三*),该期刊近五年的影响因子为4.6。
文献中,高议价能力的客户会借入更多的商业信用,低议价能力的供应商会贷出更多的商业信用。本文研究了当信贷收紧时,这种议价能力效应是增强还是减弱。我们构建了一个含商业信用的纳什讨价还价模型,并证明了,如果供应商的融资成本的增加幅度超过客户的融资成本,则议价能力效应会减弱,反之则效应会增强。通过使用披露了公司与重要客户和供应商的交易信息的中国上市公司数据库,我们检验了模型的预测。使用非国有所有权、债务展期风险和融资约束指数等指标来衡量企业融资成本对利率上升的敏感程度,我们发现利率敏感型供应商在信贷紧缩期间减少了提供给高议价能力客户的商业信用,而利率敏感型的高议价能力客户则借入了更多的商业信用。
Bargaining power and trade credit: The heterogeneous effect of credit contractions
Wenya Wang, Qiyu Xu, Ei Yang
High-bargaining-power (low-bargaining-power) customer (supplier) firms borrow (lend) more trade credit according to the literature. We study whether this bargaining power effect strengthens or weakens when credit tightens. We construct a Nash bargaining model of trade credit and show that the effect weakens if the suppliers’ financing costs increase more than that of the customers and strengthens if the opposite is true. We find support for model predictions using a unique database of listed firms in China that discloses firms’ transaction information with important customers and suppliers. Interest-rate sensitive suppliers, proxied by a non-state ownership, a high debt rollover risk, and a high financial constraint index, reduce trade credit to their high-bargaining-power customers during credit contractions, while interest-rate sensitive and high-bargaining-power customers, proxied by similar indices, borrow more trade credit.

