Workshop 预告 | 金融中介与信贷架构前沿学术研讨会

9月16日（周三）10:30-12:00

武东路100号金融学院同德楼204

在现代金融体系中，抵押资产的信息不对称与信息生产成本是决定信贷容量与金融体系结构的核心机制。债权人对不确定价值抵押品的私人信息搜寻虽出于自身风险考量，但高昂的信息获取成本往往会显著侵蚀整体融资能力，进而催生出独特的资本结构与金融中介链条。本次“金融中介与信贷架构前沿学术研讨会”特别邀请华盛顿大学福斯特商学院金融学副教授、富勒特聘教授李晔（Ye Li）担任主讲嘉宾，对其最新前沿成果《Information-Concealing Credit Architecture》展开深入研讨。该研究从微观合约设计与去中心化均衡视角切入，系统阐释了债务相较于股权如何通过违约状态下的或有所有权设计抑制债权人的高成本信息搜寻，并创新性地揭示了金融中介层级如何通过稀释概率性资产所有权，内生构建出“隐藏信息”的最优多层信贷链条。该理论为解释金融架构中看似过度的复杂性提供了全新的分析框架与理论基准，兼具理论深刻性与现实指导意义，旨在为宏观审慎监管、信贷网络风险防范及金融中介理论研究提供前沿洞见，并促进关于金融摩擦与信贷微观结构的跨方向学术交流与深入探讨。

Speaker: Ye Li (University of Washington)

Title：Information-Concealing Credit Architecture

Abstract：Creditors are tempted to examine collateral assets of uncertain value, but costly information acquisition ultimately reduces financing capacity. A pecking order emerges. Debt provides greater financing capacity than equity: unlike equity, creditors own the asset only if the borrower defaults, discouraging costly asset examination. Probabilistic asset ownership can be further diluted by introducing intermediaries between borrower and creditor, leading to a new theory of financial intermediation and credit chains. Our theory rationalizes the seemingly excessive complexity of financial architecture: the optimal chain arises in a decentralized equilibrium and is characterized by a sequence of heterogeneous intermediaries that discourages information production.